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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the risk implications of banks in the changing structure of 
the Eurozone banking industry which in the last decade and so has shifted away from 
traditional expanding strategies.  Based on a broad set of major bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) in the European monetary union for the period 2000-2015, this current thesis raises 
and tackles the question which even regulators need answered and that is if M&As between 
commercial banks of the Eurozone member states have any significant effect in the Value-at-
Risk figures of the acquiring banks’ share. A combination of various VaR calculation methods 
and event studies are applied in order to answer safely the hypothesis in question and that any 
findings originate from the events examined and not from random movements of the market. 
The results found, are somewhat similar in vein with the previous research done in the field, 
and show that the VaR of the acquirers is indeed effected by the acquisition deals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact that the financial sector has on the real economy should be considered as subtle 
and complex. The main distinction between financial institutions and all other firms is the fact 
that, said financial institutions, hold a relatively small share of real assets on their balance 
sheets. This reality leads to the acknowledgement that although the direct impact of financial 
institutions on real economy may be relatively minor, the indirect impact of financial markets 
and institutions on economic performance is extraordinarily important. The financial sector 
helps in the mobilization of savings and allocates credit across space and time. Not only does it 
provide payment services, but more importantly products which enable firms and households 
to cope with economic uncertainties by hedging, pooling, sharing, and pricing risks. An efficient 
financial sector is expected to reduce the cost and risk of producing and trading goods and 
services and thus makes an important contribution to raising standards of living.  
The importance of the financial sector is easily understood by comparing two different cases, 
one with a presence and one an absence of a financial sector. Whereas an economy without a 
financial sector could still be functional, on the other hand society's flow of savings would be 
inefficiently allocated and the stock of investment would be less productive than it might 
otherwise be, should there exist a properly functioning financial sector in said economy.  
It should also be noted that apart from influencing the economic performance of an economy 
in terms of saving and wealth allocation as well as consumption capital is allocated to the most 
promising projects which are expected to offer the highest, risk-adjusted returns. In addition, a 
wide array of financial instruments allows savers and investors to achieve their preferred trade-
off between risk and return. Confidence in the financial system encourages investors to allocate 
their savings through financial markets and institutions rather than to invest in non-productive 
assets to hedge against inflation or the risk of financial collapse. 
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THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
Importance on EU banking sector 
Advancing into more specific details, concerning the European financial institutions, in regard 
of the role they play in the monetary policies of the European member states and the 
subsequent role of the Central Banks of each country we should examine two main key 
functions, price stability and financial stability in accordance with the role of central banks in 
banking supervision. 
The approach of focusing on price stability is by now the conventional wisdom in industrialised 
countries. In the case of Europe, this consensus on the contribution of price stability in the 
medium term to promoting long-term growth is explicitly enshrined in the Statute of the ESCB, 
which states unambiguously that "the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability in the medium term." 
Among the most significant developments in Europe is the push to complete a banking union 
within the Eurozone. As the major step towards the creation of a banking union, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) officially launched in November 2014 with the primary objective 
of “ensuring the safety and soundness of the European banking system.” The SSM staff, 
composed of ECB staff as well as the national supervisory authorities of participating countries, 
is tasked with directly supervising the 123 largest banks in Europe, along with indirect 
supervision over other banks in the Eurozone.  
Effects of the financial crisis to the banking sector 
One of the most crucial legislation that affected the international banking sector was the 
Banking Act of 1933, which was also described as the Glass-Steagall Act. In essence, it was the 
legislation necessary to implement the separation of Commercial and Investment banking. In 
1998 Citibank’s affiliation with Salomon Smith Barney – one of the strongest US securities firm 
at that time – was the final hit to the Glass-Steagall Act which even forced US President Bill 
Clinton to publicly declare that the Glass-Steagall Act was no longer appropriate. Hence, in 
1999 under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the two provisions of the 1933 Banking Act that 
restricted affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms were repealed. Many 
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experts have commented that this repeal was one the main reasons that resulted to the 2008 
financial crisis  
Financial crises appeared to have a deep and protracted impact on economic growth, as it has 
been depicted by the several episodes of financial instability that occurred in many European 
countries. The contribution of prudential supervision to economic growth proceeds along two 
dimensions. From a preventive perspective, supervision should ensure a continuous and 
comprehensive monitoring of all the potential threats to financial stability. The role of 
supervision is also crucial after the emergence of a crisis, to provide for a swift and ordered 
resolution. This line of argument would support a large role for central banks in supervision, 
since they have traditionally played a large role in macro-prudential analysis and the 
preservation of financial stability and they have acquired a strong expertise in this field. It is 
therefore safe to suggest that the successful pursuance of financial stability in Europe, which is 
a prerequisite for economic growth, could benefit considerably if NCBs maintained and even 
reinforced their role in prudential supervision.  
M&A’s of European banks 
Until the 1980s the financial industries in most of the European Union Member States operated 
in highly regulated markets and as it is widely known ownership by the government played a 
more significant role. At that time the corporate control market was less developed. Stability of 
ownership structures and cross-shareholdings experienced a negative bias in some countries. 
At the same time, the markets for banking services were ta a large effect local by nature. All in 
all, the environment prevailing until the 1980s limited Mergers and Acquisitions as efficient 
ways to lead to a change of the strategies of the relevant players and of the structure of the 
market. M&As within the financial services sector are, however, not a completely new 
phenomenon. In a number of EU countries, mergers took place in the past years and at that 
time changed the market structure to a great extent. This changes were attributed to the 
creation of large national banks that the M&As led to. The M&As mostly involved institutions 
within the same sector of the financial industry, whereas there was widespread discussion 
about, and an evolution towards, universal banks or financial groups. Therefore M&As are 
definitely affecting the structure of the European banking sector as it has already been 
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observed ex post. However, they are behaving as a driving force for change themselves. M&As 
should more correctly be addressed as responses to the driving forces for change and to 
changes in market structures. The aforementioned driving forces have been identified in 
previous reports by the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC). These include, for instance, 
information technology, disintermediation, and the integration of international capital markets, 
where the creation of the single currency is especially relevant in Europe.    
The benefits of the practice of Mergers and Acquisitions have not yet been conclusively proven, 
although the banking industry is consolidating at an accelerating pace. The latest wave of Bank 
mergers in Europe was observed in the years following 1990 and up to 1999. The forecasted 
benefits of this practices are namely cost reduction and growth opportunities. It should be 
noted though that that there is little empirical evidence proving the aforementioned benefits. 
Should one need to define the differences between mergers and acquisitions, it should be 
mentioned that acquisitions seem to aim more towards increasing the value of the passive 
bank in terms of improving the quality of its loan portfolio, whereas mergers tend to aim mainly 
to the increase of the active Banks’ services reach. 
Considering how mergers and acquisitions have changed during the recent economic crisis that 
hit many of the European member states among others, while at the same time noticing that 
said crisis may represent opportunities for strong banks, there are a few interesting remarks to 
be made. During the time period of 2007 to 2008, 292 deals were announced that would be 
seen through in the area of the European financial sector. These deals were of a total value of 
€345 billion, when in 2009 the same value plummeted at €80 billion and then in 2010 at €50 
billion from which only €30 billion was in the banking sector. So as it appears mergers and 
acquisitions in the European banking sectors were indeed affected by the financial crisis. It is 
held by the literature as quite possible that the uncertainty of the completion of any merger or 
acquisition led to the reward, of the mergers and acquisitions that were ultimately successful, 
with delayed abnormal returns. It is also noted that it seems as if among the European financial 
systems merging is considered as a solution or at least as a coping mechanism to the financial 
sector and more specifically the banking sectors of each member state that suffered major 
loses during the recent economic crisis and it was implemented as such. 
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Due to serious disturbances in international currency and the increased influence of the big 
systemic banks to the rest of the global economy, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
(BCBS) was founded in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries (G-
10). At the time, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) stands as the primary 
global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and it seeks to empower the 
regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide, aiming to enhance the global 
financial stability. Through the years, namely since 1988, there has been a number of Capital 
Accords that were issued with the main purpose of reducing the institutional credit risks by 
laying an array of regulation guidelines for the banking sector. Basel II Accord was established 
in 2004 in an effort to reconsider the previously set in action Basel I Capital Accord of 1988, 
which helped set forth the minimum capital requirements that were needed for the major 
financial institutions. Basel II was finally adopted by the European Union in January of 2008, 
after the beginning of the financial crisis. Subsequently, during the Great Financial Crisis and 
after reaching the realisation that a greater revision of the Basel II protocols was thought that it 
should be seriously considered by the BCBS. Indeed, in July 2009 BCBS released Basel II, in July 
2009 in order to timely and actively address the ongoing concerns regarding the Banks’ capital 
requirements across the globe. Ultimately, new regulations, including stricter monetary and 
fiscal reforms for the financial sector were agreed upon in July 2010 and were endorsed as 
Basel III in September 2010, and they still remain in power until today.  
The Basel Accords in unity represent the understanding of the people involved in the financial 
business sector that the financial and even more specifically the banking industry had started 
playing such an important role in the markets’ growth that it should not be left unmonitored. 
This recognition led to the birth of the need for a system of rules, to which every business that 
belongs to the above-mentioned sectors should abide. 
Therefore it came naturally to the business world when on July 15th, 1988 the first Basel Accord 
was enforced as a landmark financial agreement that acted as a means of regulation for the 
banks that were acting in the commercial sector. The main purposes it served, as it was 
explicitly stated by the representatives of the ten biggest central banks from the Group of Ten 
(G-10) countries, was the strengthening of the soundness and stability of the international 
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banking system through the provision of a minimum standard for capital requirements, 
although only in the field covering the credit risks. Another purpose was also the creation of a 
levelled “playing field” among all the international banks through the harmonization of the 
global regulations. After the new ratios, although not statutory, were fully implemented by the 
G-10 countries by December 1992, more than 100 countries have implemented the Accord. 
An ex-post evaluation of the 1988 approach that led to the Basel I Accord, would showcase 
success in stabilization of the financial system. It had a great effect in increasing the banking 
capital ratios to an extent that allowed most banks to sustain enough capital to deal with the 
main risks that the financial and banking sector were believed to face at that time. Although it 
may have provided successful solutions to some of the problems the two sectors were facing it 
has been criticized among other reasons, for the reason of leading to regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulatory arbitrage can be generally defined as a transaction that takes advantage of each and 
any inconsistencies in regulatory requirements between banks that had adopted the accord 
and the ones that did not. 
To deal with most of the problems the first accord did not attain to and also to consider the 
wide changes the international banking and financial sector was dealing with in June 2004 the 
Basel Committee concluded upon a detailed revision to the preceding accord. It was meant to 
be implemented by the end of 2006 in order to provide sufficient time to the countries that 
wanted to adopt it to deal with law-making processes, although the most advanced credit-risk 
and operational-risk approaches were planned to take effect by the end of 2007.  
The main three pillars upon Basel II was constructed, were first the set-up of capital charges 
against credit risk, market risk and operational risk and the consistency of the capital 
requirements. The second pillar implores the enlarged role of bank regulators. These 
supervisors are burdened with the responsibility of ensuring that banks operate above the 
minimum set regulatory capital ratios, that they have a risk assessing process and finally that 
when problems develop, the correct actions are delivered. Last but not least, the third pillar 
engulfs the establishment of a set of disclosure recommendations that creates incentives to the 
bank in order to publish many information such as exposures and risk profiles in order to 
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construct a healthy and viable market discipline that would strategically lead banks to conduct 
their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner. Those three pillars are viewed both by the 
banking and financial sector and the Basel Committee as mutually and inter-parties reinforcing. 
Apart from the Basel Accords, before, during and after the time period that is called the Great 
Financial Crisis and consists of the time frame between 2009 to 2012, there have been some 
mechanisms that were implemented in order to secure financial stability and to ensure that the 
interest rates that the European member states would have to face when requesting to borrow 
money from the markets would not be unrealistic.  
As a solution to the fear that, because of the growing decrease of some European States’ 
credibility, the interest rates would skyrocket and therefore the loans would no longer be 
feasibly repaid, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) institution was set up as a non-
permanent solution in June 2010. Consequently, and for the same reasons and with the same 
task in October 2012 the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) institution was founded as the 
permanent successor of the EFSF.  
The main purpose of the ESM was simplistic but not a simple one, to provide an alternative, 
secure and at the best rate this could be achieved, solution for the European Union member 
states that were dealing with the devastating consequences of the economic crisis and that 
were, or would have been in the future, unable to request loans directly from the markets. 
Since most of the countries that requested the two aforementioned institutions for help, 
namely Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, have finished their financial stability programs 
without the need for any follow–up arrangements, it is believed that the actions that were 
taken, in the form of the design and execution of two supervising, consulting and loan handling 
institutions synthesise the correct approach for dealing with the crisis’s results, at least within 
the European Union borders.  
Having analyzed and discussed the various regulations that were implemented by the various 
governmental and non-governmental institutions both at a worldwide level but also at a more 
concise, European, level, the only question that remains to be answered is why has regulation 
of the financial and banking sector been deemed as mandatory. 
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It should not be easily understood as a natural way of the evolution of a business sector that 
the economic risk capital, the amount of money that companies should devote to support their 
financial activities after having considered the risk-return trade-offs involved in each occasion, 
should be regulated. Bearing that in mind, regulation is generally viewed as mandatory when 
markets are unable to efficiently allocate their resources. In the way that this case is being 
studied in this paper, for commercial banks, this is true for two reasons.  
The first reason arises when externalities should be accounted for. When a financial institution 
fails and defaults and as a result this leads with a cascading effect to other firms, this is 
considered a negative externality to the institution, namely a Systemic Risk. Systemic risk also 
poses a danger because it is very difficult to be evaluated since it involves situations of extreme 
instability. 
The second main reason, is that banking and financial institutions in general are in need of 
regulations regarding their deposit insurances. It is widely known that by nature, bank deposits 
withdrawals have a destabilizing effect. The main risks are posed upon the fact that if 
depositors develop a rational or irrational, it does not matter which of the two, fear that the 
bank they have deposited their money to, may be insolvent, they may develop a need to 
require their money back. This can create situations that are called “bank runs” (or else “runs 
on the bank”), situations that as recent European and more specifically Greek history has 
proven, force the banks to liquidate their assets at a great cost or may even lead to the closures 
of the banks or may even ask for State interventions, namely the enforcement of capital 
controls and so. 
One of the solutions that are offered to the above problems, apart from the general 
regulations, is the practice of the government bodies to guarantee the bank deposits, thus 
leading to the elimination of the rationale for bank runs. These guarantees developed a side 
benefit, as well, for the small depositors, who are unable to monitor their banks with efficiency 
since this monitoring can prove quite complex, expensive and time consuming for the said 
small depositors. The vast literature that has expanded on the matter whether these 
“guarantees” the governments provide, should be provided by the governments or by private 
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institutions, although the fact that this has not yet come to a conclusion that everyone accepts, 
proves that there is a need for further regulation regarding this subject. Most of the discussion 
develops around the moral dangers that surface when governments guarantee bank deposits. 
Governmental reassurance leads, on one hand, depositors to abstain from their responsibility 
of monitoring their banks, as they would have done in any other sector of the market, and on 
the other hand it offers to the bank owners a win-win situation. Any bank owner can apt to 
take part into high risk taking in order to make his bank prosper and in the event that his risks 
are not seen through and his bank defaults, then the government will step in and pay back the 
depositors.  
The moral danger issue that arises from the previously discussed topic of deposit insurance, 
explains in general, why regulators attempt to control risk-taking activities, as well as why these 
regulations need to be deemed mandatory and why it is so difficult for the regulations to 
deliver the outcome they were enforced to deliver. At the same time, the topic of the need to 
decide on the appropriate level of capital requirements to sustain a well-founded financial 
system remains to be solved. These problems and issues that have mainly arisen from the 
ongoing growth of financial and banking institutions around the globe and the subsequent 
acquisition of a different position inside the markets have all led to the Basel Accords and the 
foundation of the European and International institutions whose main mission is to monitor 
and deal with all this situations that appear to be accompanying the financial and banking 
sector by nature. 
At this point, and before we begin the main part of this paper, it is substantial to understand 
what exactly risk management is all about and how is risk defined. Risk can be defined as the 
volatility of unexpected outcomes, which can represent the value of assets, equity or earnings. 
Each and any firm can be exposed to different kinds of risks, that can be categorized into 
business and financial risks. Broadly speaking, business risks are those risks that the 
corporations take up voluntarily in order to sustain their competitive advantage in their 
respective market sector in order to provide more value for the shareholders. The business 
risks are comprised of the business decisions the companies make, such as investment 
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decisions, marketing strategies and more. Financial risks on the other hand, consist of the 
inevitable risks any company takes, and they relate to possible losses that happen because of 
financial market activities. By understanding these kinds of risks, the financial manager has a 
better understanding of the consequences of adverse outcomes and can be better prepared.  
The recent growth of the risk management industry is due to the fact that the financial markets 
have been volatile since the 1970s. Indeed, during the previous 40 years, there have been many 
developments, whose only constant is their unpredictability. To name only some of them we 
can remember the oil price shocks that happened in 1973, the Black Monday incident during 
which U.S. stock index plummeted by 23 percent, the Russian default in 1998 which sparked a 
global financial crisis and of course the terrorist attack on the U.S. on the 11th of September 
2011, that froze the financial markets for six days causing a loss of 1.7 trillion USD. In each of 
the above events, and during many more times in the same time period, the market observers 
were astounded by the volatility and rapidity of the changes, which resulted to substantial 
financial losses. Therefore, it goes without saying that financial risk management is capable to 
provide a, as partial as it may be, protection against such sources of risk. 
Approaching the meaning of financial risk management, it should be stated that it encompasses 
the design and the establishment of procedures in order to identify, measure and manage 
financial risks. One of the many possibilities is the establishment of stop-loss limits. This means 
that if the total loss that incurred by a trader exceeds a defined limit, his position has to be cut. 
The problem that appears when managers use this tool is that the controls are applied post-
event. This fact has developed a need for managers to develop and use ex-ante risk controls. 
One way to do this is by applying a limit on the notional amount which has also already been 
proven not efficient, and therefore has been deemed incomplete. It does not take under 
consideration the volatility of the many risk factors nor their correlations. Also it is not useful in 
the setup of consistent limits across bonds and equities. This is where the Value-at-Risk method 
appeared to pose as a solution to the aforementioned incompetence of the risk management 
practices.  
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Literature Review 
Empirical research into the influence of an M&A deal of a bank on its stock prices and risk levels 
has concentrated mainly on bank M&As in the US, while it is less researched in European 
financial sector and even less in the Eurozone banking industry. 
Benston et al (1995) through their research were led to the conclusion that acquiring banks 
that seek to decrease total risk are willing to pay a premium for the target banks that will help 
reduce the overall risk of the newly formed banking organization. In essence, they theorized 
that there should exist a negative correlation between the acquisition premium and the target 
bank’s contribution to the sum of risk of the new organization. 
Regarding the level of risk exposure between bank M&As Madura and Wiant (1994) found 
conclusive evidence that intrastate acquisitions and acquiring banks with low growth rates 
were exposed to lower risk levels in comparison to banks with increased growth. This was 
explained as the focus of these slow growing banks was more intense as they were pressured 
by poor performance to make more effective and cost reducing restructuring decisions. In 
addition to this research, Choi et al (2010) examine the impact of cross-border bank mergers 
and acquisitions on bond yields and thus on the riskiness of acquiring banks. Their investigation 
uses bond yields as a metric because they undeviatingly measure the perceived risk of the 
banks’ bondholders which are an important group of stakeholders. Their particular study 
showed that cross-border bank M&As were more risk-increased activities in comparison to 
domestic M&As. Keeley (1990) pointed out that these riskier cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are as such due to the incentives of the banks’ management and shareholders to 
shift risk when the regulatory safety net and guarantees are underpriced. Additionally, Winton 
(1999) states that international diversification ensues risk-increasing monitoring complications. 
Also, Bendeck Sushka (1988) concluded that banks that proceed to multiple acquisitions of 
other banks make use of economies of scale in the tasks needed to integrate the target’s 
operations with their own reserving higher level of capital thus reducing their overall risk 
exposure. However, they argue that when this is done in increased frequency the acquiring 
banks have trouble focusing their goals making the consolidating process less effective. 
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An interesting way of using the VaR analysis was what Agata (2012) did in order to measure the 
effectiveness of banks. Among the diverse ways to use this method, Agata used it to correct 
various indicators of bank interest margins. Deriving data for the period 1998-2012 from 
financial statements of public banks listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange, two new groups of risk-
adjusted interest margins were computed in order to set the lowest boundaries that can be 
expected with the assumed probability of the estimation. 
In 2004, De Nicolo et al, found evidence that high concentration of a banking system, as 
measured by a five-firm concentration ratio, was associated with higher levels of systemic risk 
potential, and such relationship has not become weaker through time. 
In 2000 Allen and Jagtiani, employed a simulation based research to study the risk effects of 
combining banking, securities and insurance activities by creating synthetic universal banks. 
Their results suggest that diversification powers will result in the reduction of total risk of bank 
holding companies, but this reduction comes with a price which is the increase of non-
diversifiable, systematic risk. 
Amihud et al. (2002) in an effort to examine what were the effects of cross-border bank M&As 
on the risk and abnormal returns of the acquiring banks, were led to the conclusion that the 
overall risk of the acquiring banks did not shift relatively to the event of a M&A. After analyzing 
various international bank M&As they saw that the sum of risk of the acquiring banks neither 
decreased nor increased. Particularly, en masse the acquiring banks had neither their 
systematic nor their comprehensive risk reduce in comparison with banks in their national 
financial market. 
Boyd et al. (1993) tested empirically the dispute over whether bank holding companies should 
be permitted to enter nonbanking activities in terms of the extended nonbanking positions 
would have on bank holding companies total risk. They tested this subject analytically by 
reproducing speculative mergers between bank holding companies and nonbanking financial 
firms and calculating risk measures for the hypothetical merged firms and comparing these 
figures with the relative risk figures of the actual unmerged bank holding companies. They 
concluded their research by discovering that the hypothetical mergers of bank holding 
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companies with insurance companies may decrease the level of risk, but the overall risk of bank 
holding companies with real estate or other securities firms would possibly increase. 
In the argument on the risk diversification motive for bank M&As, some believe that acquirers 
choose target banks that will cause an important decrease in their risk vulnerability. Other 
groups advocate that acquirers think it is profitable to boost their deposit insurance subsidy 
either by increasing their risk hazard or by trying to become “too big to fail”. The latter is 
explained by Morrison and White (2011) who showed that as the level of public insecurity 
regarding the banking commercial sector and their deposits rises, so that depositors are more 
driven to withdraw their money from the banks, regulators should offset this trend and with a 
more attractive deposit insurance arrangement.   When it comes to banks’ vulnerability and 
probability of default, Craig and Santos (1997) using a large sample of bank holding companies 
and their M&As measured with two ways the level of the risk for both pre- and post-acquisition 
of the banks. At first, they calculated the standard deviations of the return on assets and on 
equity and afterwards they used the Z-score statistic to verify their results. Compared to the 
industry, target banks are riskier pre-acquisition but according to both the standard deviation 
computations and the Z-score after the event they become relatively safer. Based on the Z-
score, the new institutions that surface after the acquisitions have a lower probability of 
default. However, there M&A events do not appear to affect the Z-scores of the acquirers in a 
statistically significant manner. 
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
According to previous researches on the field, this analysis aims to establish the influence that 
bank acquisitions in member states of the Eurozone have on the financial risk that the acquirers 
face. Specifically, using the Wilcoxon T-test, the average ex-ante and post-ante VaR of the 
prices of said bank acquirers are statistically examined. In order to have more secured results, 
the VaR figures are calculated utilizing three different methods at both 95% and 99% level of 
significance. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data selection 
This study reports results only for major acquisitions of banks from the Eurozone, and more 
specifically acquisitions of banks from some of the initial member states of the Eurozone, like 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and two major deals that took place in the Greek 
banking sector. The data for this study was obtained from the Bloomberg database and the 
Thomson ONE database. Using the Thomson ONE database, the major bank M&As that were 
completed for the period between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2015 and afterwards utilizing the 
Bloomberg database, the closing prices of these banks were obtained. Events after which the 
acquirer did not hold more than 50% of the target firm’s shares after the acquisition was 
completed were left out of our sample. It is imperative to highlight that a variety of different 
chronologically events summed the data, both ex and post crisis. The major criteria used to 
filter the sample selection was that both the acquirers and the target banks were public 
commercial banks located in the Eurozone and particularly in the member states mentioned 
above: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Hence data for 32 commercial banks 
were obtained. It is important to state that all the banks were listed before and after the 
events, so that the research is not affected by de-listings or effects specific to private financial 
institutions. Both the acquirers and the targets have specific SIC codes as presented in the table 
below.  
 
Table 1 - Bank SIC codes criteria 
The list of all deals under scrutiny are depicted in the following table: 
SIC codes Description
6000 Banks, non-US chartered
6021 National commercial banks
6029 Commercial banks, not elsewhere clasified
Acquirer and Target banks SIC codes
[23] 
 
 
Table 2-Acquisition Deals 
Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the Value-at-Risk of the acquiring bank’s share 
price is altered after the deal of the M&A with the target bank and whether the event itself is 
the elemental reason that altered the VaR.  
For this reason, I calculated the daily returns for every daily closing price of the banks under 
scrutiny as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = log(𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1⁄ )  
In the formula above, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the realized return on share 𝑖 in time 𝑡 and the closing price of the share in 
day 𝑡 is depicted as𝑃𝑡. Finally, log is the natural logarithm. 
Value-at -Risk (VaR) analysis 
Over the last decade, risk management has experienced a revolution. There has been an 
increased emphasis on the development and reporting of quantitative risk measures due to the 
rise and growth of risk management as a profession. One might say that an alarming awareness 
has been flourished in the minds of senior managers as there is a more vital need to 
Acquirer Target Date Completed
Banco Santander Central Hispan SA Credito Predial Portugues SA 07/04/2000
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco totta Acores SA 07/04/2000
Banca Popolare di Milano SpA Banca di Legnano SpA 26/06/2001
UniCredit SpA Rolo Banca 1473 SpA 01/07/2002
Credit Agricole SA Credit Lyonnais SA 27/05/2003
Credit Foncier de France SA Entenial SA 04/02/2004
UniCredit SpA Bayerische Hypound Vereinsbank AG 23/11/2005
Banca Intensa SpA SanPaolo IMI SpA 01/01/2007
Banche Popolari Unite SCRL (UBI BANCA) Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA 01/04/2007
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banca CR Firenze SpA 29/01/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Galicia SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Castilla SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Credito Balear SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Vasconia SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Andalucia SA 19/05/2009
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Banca Italease SpA 15/07/2009
Piraeus Bank SA General Bank of Greece SA 14/12/2012
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco Espanol de Credito SA 03/05/2013
Eurobank Ergasias SA TT Hellenic Postbank SA 02/09/2013
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco Pastor SA 08/03/2012
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understand the risks that their companies are exposed to. Many firms and organizations have 
started to report financial risk information in their annual reports as investors and other 
stakeholders need this information so that they can be in a position to make more informed 
decisions. 
Value at Risk (VaR) originated from the financial disasters of the early ‘90s which had in 
common that billions of dollars could be lost due to poor oversight and management of 
financial risks. Taking action, major financial institutions and regulators examined and 
employed the VaR methodology which was an easy to understand and implement technique 
for evaluating market risk. 
VaR analysis is a summary statistical measure used to calculate and quantify the level of 
financial risk of a firm or an investment portfolio over a specific time interval. It can be defined 
as the worst possible loss that might be expected from holding a position over a given period of 
time (a single day, or 10 days for the purpose of regulatory capital reports1 or more) and at a 
stated level of probability known as the “confidence level” which is usually 99% or 95%. VaR is a 
preferable and charming tool simply because it is easy to comprehend. Basically, it gives an 
answer to the question all Chief Risk Officers want answered, which is “How bad can things 
get?”. VaR can be defined as the maximum likely loss on a portfolio over a particular holding 
period. In spite the fact that many researchers have argued that VaR is not the most effective 
technique to use, it is still the most popular statistical calculation of risk that both senior risk 
managers and regulators use. 
 It is most frequently used by investment and commercial banks in order to determine the 
extent and manifestation ratio of the worst potential losses in their financial positions. There is 
no standard protocol of how this statistical analysis can be used. For example, VaR can be 
computed for specific portfolios and positions or to calculate institution-wide financial risk 
vulnerability. Applying a firm-wide VaR analysis allows for the estimation of the cumulative 
risks from positions of different departments within the firm. Using the information provided 
by that analysis senior management can determine whether or not the firm has acceptable 
                                                          
1 For regulatory capital purposes, it is obligatory that Regulatory VaR is computed at a 99% level of confidence over 
a 10 – day time horizon. 
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capital reserves in place to cover for these worst expected losses or if it has to mitigate the risk 
of come concentrated holdings. 
Initially confined to measuring market risk, VaR is now being applied to handle and manage risk 
firmly well beyond derivatives. The VaR approach now is now serving as a tool to gauge credit 
risk and even operational risk. 
In the end, the greatest merit of VaR possibly lies in the enforcement of a disciplined 
methodology for critically taking into account risk. Financial institutions that proceed to 
calculate their VaR are bound to confront their liability to financial risks and build up 
autonomous risk management functions to oversee the front and back offices. Hence, the 
means of getting to the VaR figure could be as important as the number itself. 
If 𝐿𝑡,𝑡+ℎ is the expected loss between time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + ℎ, 𝑃 is the probability of the outcome at a 
given confidence level of 𝑎, then:  
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,ℎ(𝑎) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 {{𝑥 ∈  ℝ ∶  𝑃𝑡(𝐿𝑡,𝑡+ℎ ≤ 𝑥) ≥ 1 − 𝑎}  2 
The time series of returns are presumably disassembled in two components, one regarded as 
predictable and the other unpredictable or defined as “innovation process”. In essence, if 𝑅𝑡 is 
the share price return at time 𝑡, then: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 
whereas 𝐼𝑡−1 is the noted information in time 𝑡 − 1, 𝐸 is the conditional mean and 𝜀𝑡 is the 
innovation in the share’s returns. 
Furthermore, 𝜀𝑡 as the conditional variance is noted, is a positive, time-varying and computable 
function of the information set at time t-1. Even though the innvovation process for the 
conditional mean is serially uncorrelated, it is independent from time. Other variations in 
respect to 𝜎𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 modelling using parametric, non-parametric or semi-parametric methods, 
generate different techniques for calculating the VaR of the shares’ returns. The methods used 
in this research are the following: 
                                                          
2 Given a confidence level 𝑎, the VaR of the institution or portfolio is given by the lowest value 𝑥 such that the 
probability 𝑃 that the loss 𝐿 exceeds 𝑥 is at most equal to 1 − 𝑎. 
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Parametric VaR 
The VaR calculation can be easily become more straightforward if the distribution can be 
assumed to belong to the parametric family, such as the normal distribution and if some 
hypotheses can be made the conditional variance innovation. When this is the situation, the 
VaR price can be derived straight from the security or portfolio using a multiplicative factor that 
is dependent on the confidence level. This method is named parametric because it consists of 
estimated parameters, like the standard deviation rather than just reading the quantile off the 
empirical distribution. The parametric VaR is more convenient and usually it produces more 
conclusive computations of VaR.  
The two more frequently methods used to regarding the estimating model for the conditional 
variance, are the RiskMetrics method that was innovated by J.P Morgan in October 1994 and 
the General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) method. RiskMetrics can 
be credited as the stimulant for further research in risk management as many banks have been 
encouraged to develop new generations of risk management systems. In this thesis, we will use 
the RiskMetrics technique in order to compute the Parametric VaR. 
Contrary to the theory that share price returns follow a random walk with a constant 𝜎 over 
time, RiskMetrics assumes that variance changes over time and exhibits autocorrelation. To put 
it differently, periods of time with increased volatility aggregation are usually followed by time 
periods with high volatility clustering as well. Hence, it can be assumed that variance could be 
patterned as a function of its past values. 
Although the shares’ returns are not autocorrelated, their squared values are, and because the 
expected squared returns are variances3, autocorrelation in variances is implied. RiskMetrics, in 
favor of capturing the features of volatility, mobilizes the exponentially weighted moving 
average of the past squared prices of the returns and so the next day’s volatility can be 
described as a weighted average of today’s squared returns and volatility as shown below: 
𝜎𝑡+1
2 =  λ ∗ 𝜎𝑡
2 + (1 − 𝜆) ∗ 𝑅𝑡
2 
                                                          
3 It is assumed that the average variation of returns is zero, so: 
𝜎𝑡−1
2 = 1 𝑛⁄ ∑ 𝑅𝑡+1−𝜄
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Where 𝜎𝑡
2 and 𝜎𝑡+1
2  are the forecasted variance in time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 respectively. The square of 
the share returns on time 𝑡 is 𝑅𝑡
2 and the proposed and most frequently used weight factor (=
0.94) is 𝜆. 
Non-Parametric or Historical VaR 
This is a more general technique that does not make any assumption about the model of the 
distribution of the returns. It is easier to implement and is also called non-parametric historical 
simulation. The main principle in this method is that is history is going to repeat itself. The 
returns get sorted in an ascending order and the VaR at the confidence level 𝑎 is chosen such as 
that only the 100𝑎% of the total observations are lower than 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎  .This specification is valid 
for any distribution, continuous or discrete, thin- or fat- tailed. 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 =  −𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒({𝑅𝑡+1−𝜏}𝜏−1
𝑚 , 100𝑎) 
Although the non-parametric method is simple to use, it has the disadvantage of placing the 
same weight in all observations which means it takes as granted that recent and past returns 
are equally important.  
Filtered Historical Simulation VaR 
In an effort to fuse the two previous methods that were cited together, the so called semi-
parametric or Filtered Historical Simulation approach for measuring the VaR was created. By 
mixing the model of estimating variances and rather that making some kind of hypothesis 
about the underlying distribution, but utilizing past data to acquire the values for our returns, 
they are divided by the predicted standard deviation for the sake of making them standardized, 
the formula below can be adopted in order to compute the VaR: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 = −𝜎𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒({𝑧𝑡+1−𝜏}𝜏−1
𝑚 , 100𝑎) 
whereas 𝜎𝑡+1 is the variance that was estimated using the RisMetrics and 𝑧𝑡+1−𝜏 is the 
standardized past residuals which are calculated by dividing the observed returns by the 
estimated variances:  
𝑧𝑡+1−𝜏 = 𝑅𝑡+1−𝜏 𝜎𝑡+1−𝜏⁄  
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The convenience of this method is that using the historical simulation method it creates a 
parametric model to calculate the variance while not requiring any particular assumption for 
the distribution of the standardized residuals. 
Statistically Testing the Hypothesis Statement 
After using the three different methods explained previously for computing the VaR of the 
acquiring bank’s shares for at least 60 days before and 60 days after the M&A deal was 
completed, an average ex-ante and one average post-ante VaR were calculated for every 
acquisition. As I mentioned above, according to the Basel Accord regulations, a 99% confidence 
interval (𝑎 = 1%) is mandatory to be used for measuring VaR. For the sake of the statistical 
significance of our findings we calculated the VaRs using the three methods using both a 99% 
and 95% as our confidence interval. 
After acquiring all the VaR prices using all the three methods for both confidence intervals, for 
the sake of examining if the changes in VaR was due to the acquisition events, the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was used. The Wilcoxon signed-rank which is sometimes referred to as the 
Wilcoxon T-test, is the nonparametric equivalent to the dependent t-test, and is used to 
compare two sets of scores that come from the same participants. (Wilcoxon 1945) The main 
difference from the dependent t-test is that the Wilcoxon signed-rank test does not assume 
normality in the data. In this case, the two participants (pairs) that will be compared are the ex-
ante VaR and post-ante VaR prices. The following assumptions must be made concerning the 
data. Both dependent variables are should be measured at the ordinal or continuous level. This 
is to guarantee that the values can be compared so we can conclude for every pair if one value 
is less, equal or greater than the other. Also, the paired data must originate from the same 
population, so that the same subjects are present in both groups. 
As specified above, the Wilcoxon is a non-parametric test, substitute to the parametric t-test. 
To use it, at first, we must construct an 𝑛-sized sample of paired observations. The 𝑖-th pair 
(𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛) is noted as (𝑋𝑖𝑌𝑖) from the paired sample drawn from the two populations 𝑋 
and 𝑌 which are the ex-ante and post-ante average VaRs respectively. A difference score 𝐷𝑖  is 
designated for each pair. A positive (+) or negative (−) sign is attached to each pair contingent 
upon the score of their difference whether that is positive or negative respectively. Afterwards, 
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the data is cleaned of any pairs with 0 difference, thus a new sample of non-zero differences, 𝑛′ 
is created. Subsequently, the absolute values of the sample’s observations (|𝐷𝑖|) are ranked in 
an ascending order and taking into account the sign of each pair’s difference we assign it again 
in every pair, thus constructing a new set of values 𝑅𝑖. 
The Wilcoxon T-test statistic is noted as 𝑊 and is computed as the total sum of the positive 
ranks as shown below: 
𝑊 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖
(+)
𝑛′
𝑖=1
  
We can assume that for the samples of this research that are 𝑛′ > 20, the Wilcoxon T-test 
statistic  𝑊, is normally distributed, hence its mean and standard deviation are given by the 
following formulae respectively: 
𝜇𝑊 =
𝑛′(𝑛′ + 1)
4
,                 𝜎𝑊 = √
𝑛′(𝑛′ + 1)(2𝑛′ + 1)
24
        
Regarding our hypothesis statement, we must compose the null hypothesis for our statistical 
test. Hence, the null hypothesis 𝐻0 is: 
𝐻0 ∶  𝑀𝐷 = 0 
where 𝑀𝐷 is the population’s median difference, and since it is a two tailed test, the alternative 
is: 
𝐻1 ∶  𝑀𝐷 ≠ 0 
In essence, if the null hypothesis gets rejected, we conclude that the change of the VaR figure 
of the acquiring bank is due to the acquisition event. 
Finally in order to test if the null hypothesis is rejected, the critical 𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 value of the Wilcoxon 
T-test statistic must be calculated using the formula below: 
𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 =
𝑊 −
𝑛′(𝑛′ + 1)
4
√𝑛
′(𝑛′ + 1)(2𝑛′ + 1)
24
 
The null hypothesis 𝐻0, can be safely rejected if  𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 < −1.645 or if  𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 > 1.645 at a 95% 
confidence interval and if  𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 < −2.326 or if 𝑍𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 > 2.326 at a 99% confidence interval. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This thesis aspires to investigate if bank M&As in the Eurozone have any effect in Value-at-Risk 
of the acquirer bank firm’s share price. The examination was built on the abnormal returns 
gained with the use of the “market model” and within the bounds of the case study 
methodology (ex-ante VaR and post-ante VaR). The day that the deal was confirmed to be 
completed is chosen to be day zero. The reason behind this decision is that this research is only 
concerned with the reaction of the market for the new entity after the acquisition was 
concluded. It is assumed that future expectations both for returns and volatility are integrated 
and projected in the share price’s characteristics immediately after the transaction.  
In total, this paper’s results align in what was expected in respect to what was previously 
researched in the field. Most papers, when they have concluded on some statistical significant 
results, reported a reduction in total risk measured in terms of the share’s standard deviation 
and an increase in the shareholder wealth for the bidder financial firms. Considering that these 
two factors affect the VaR of the share, it was expected that we would find a small reduction in 
the VaR results. 
 
Table 3-Banco Popular Espanol SA Acquisition 
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -9.578% -9.139% 1381.00 3.430506999
Risk Metrics (5%) -6.772% -6.462% 1381.00 3.430506999
Historical Simulation (1%) -6.866% -7.468% 0.00 -6.679958738
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.484% -5.766% 0.00 -6.679958738
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -10.770% -10.277% 1381.00 3.430506999
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -6.854% -6.541% 1381.00 3.430506999
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -8.953% -5.511% 1830.00 6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -6.330% -3.897% 1830.00 6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -8.196% -8.245% 0.00 -3.179797338
Historical Simulation (5%) -5.834% -5.768% 1288.00 16.93409823
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -10.067% -6.197% 1830.00 6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -6.407% -3.944% 1830.00 6.735866746
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -5.267% -5.460% 569.00 -2.547114639
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.724% -3.861% 569.00 -2.547114639
Historical Simulation (1%) -5.671% -6.045% 0.00 -5.841307997
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.006% -4.335% 0.00 -6.092717958
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.922% -6.140% 569.00 -2.547114639
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.769% -3.908% 569.00 -2.547114639
Banco Popular Espanol SA
Banco De Galicia SA, Banco De Castilla SA, Banco De Credito Balear SA, Banco De Vasconia SA
Banco De Andalucia SA
Banco Pastor SA
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As we can examine from Table 3, in case of the simultaneous acquisitions of Banco de Galicia 
SA, Banco de Castilla SA, Banco de Credito Balear SA and Banco de Vasconia SA, the null 
hypothesis in question is rejected in both confidence intervals and using all the methods 
analyzed above for calculating VaR. At the 99% confidence interval every z-score is rejected 
because it is higher than the critical value of 2.326 for the RiskMetrics (RM) and the Filtered 
Historical Method (FHS), and below the -2.326 value using the Historical Simulation (HS) to 
measure the VaR. Additionally, all the z-scores were much higher than 1.645 critical value for 
the 95% confidence interval using both the RM and FHS methods, and lower than the -1645 
boundary when the VaR was calculated with the HS technique. The same can be said for the 
acquisition of Banco Pastor SA in 2012 as all the z-scores were below the critical values of -
2.326 and -1.645 for 99% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. Finally, the acquisition of 
Banco de Andalucia in 2009 SA leads us to the same conclusions as every time the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Given that we have rejected the null hypotheses for all methods at every 
level of significance we can safely assume that the VaR of Banco Popular Espanol SA was 
altered due to the aforementioned acquisition. 
 
Table 4-Banco Santander Central Hispan SA Acquisition 
In table 4, we can make the same assumptions for Banco Santander Central Hispan SA for all 
the three acquisitions as we did previously for Banco Popular Espanol SA, although it is 
interesting to mention that only for the level of significane of 𝑎 = 1% and using the HS, I found 
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -4.981% -4.333% 1646.00 5.381331794
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.522% -3.064% 1646.00 5.381331794
Historical Simulation (1%) -4.535% -4.278% 733.00 1.198649002
Historical Simulation (5%) -2.633% -2.893% 0.00 -6.451482126
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.745% -4.998% 1646.00 5.381331794
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.552% -3.090% 1646.00 5.381331794
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -4.687% -4.025% 1735.00 6.036514461
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.314% -2.846% 1735.00 6.036514461
Historical Simulation (1%) -5.355% -5.269% 191.00 0.048049998
Historical Simulation (5%) -3.833% -3.238% 1626.00 5.234099734
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.406% -4.642% 1735.00 6.036514461
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.342% -2.870% 1735.00 6.036514461
Banco Santander Central Hispan SA
Credito Predial Portugues SA, Banco totta Acores SA
Banco Espanol de Credito SA
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different results and the 𝐻0 could not be rejected. However, judging from the ex-ante and post-
ante average VaR figures the VaR had slightly decrease on most cases after the deal was 
completed. 
 
Table 5-Banca Intensa SpA Acquisition 
Once more, regarding Banca Intensa SpA and its two acquisitions we can safely reject the 𝐻0 for 
both acquisitions and all methods except for the case of the acquisition of SanPaolo IMI SpA 
where the VaR was calculated using the HS at the 99% level of significance. In this case the 𝐻0 
cannot be rejected. In addition, as wen can observe from the ex-ante and post-ante average 
VaR figures, there was a slight increase in the VaR after both acquisitions. 
 
Table 6-Banca Popolare di Milano SpA Acquisition 
When the acquisition of Banca di Legnano SpA by Banca Popolare di Milano SpA is examined, 
we can only reject the 𝐻0 at the 95% level of significance and using both the RM and FHS 
methods. In all the other cases the hypothesis in question could not be rejected, so we cannot 
make any assumptions concerning the influence of the event on the acquirer’s VaR levels. 
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.403% -2.690% 496.00 -3.084511658
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.699% -1.902% 496.00 -3.084511658
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.373% -2.377% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.770% -1.784% 99.00 -3.676274534
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.649% -2.966% 496.00 -3.084511658
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.725% -1.931% 496.00 -3.084511658
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.782% -4.565% 14.00 -6.632804304
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.967% -3.228% 14.00 -6.632804304
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.714% -3.885% 0.00 -6.509353379
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.795% -2.086% 0.00 -6.509353379
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.067% -5.034% 14.00 -6.632804304
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.997% -3.277% 14.00 -6.632804304
Banca Intensa SpA
SanPaolo IMI SpA
Banca CR Firenze SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -3.573% -3.382% 1192.00 2.039164031
Risk Metrics (5%) -2.527% -2.391% 1192.00 2.039164031
Historical Simulation (1%) -3.811% -3.942% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -2.712% -2.655% 715.00 1.302581231
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.898% -3.690% 1192.00 2.039164031
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -2.462% -2.330% 1192.00 2.039164031
Banca Popolare di Milano SpA
Banca di Legnano SpA
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Table 7-Banche Popolari Unite SCRL Acquisition 
Examining Table 7, we reject the 𝐻0 again on both the RM and FHS on both levels of 
significance, although the same cannot be said for the HS. 
 
Table 8-Banco Popolare (Societe Cooperativa) Acquisition 
Once more, as it is depicted in Table 8, the null hypothesis is rejected using the RM and FHS 
methods and even at the 95% significant level with HS method, we cannot reject it for the 99% 
significant level using the Historical Simulation. 
 
Table 9-Piraeus Banks SA Acquisition 
 
Table 10-Eurobank Ergasias SA 
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.079% -2.305% 319.00 -4.387515389
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.470% -1.630% 319.00 -4.387515389
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.667% -2.632% 173.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.396% -1.466% 17.00 1.302581231
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.400% -2.661% 319.00 -4.387515389
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.542% -1.709% 319.00 -4.387515389
Banche Popolari Unite SCRL (UBI BANCA)
Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -11.086% -6.268% 1821.00 6.669612319
Risk Metrics (5%) -7.839% -4.432% 1821.00 6.669612319
Historical Simulation (1%) -14.049% -14.131% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -8.236% -8.422% 0.00 -3.407771005
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -12.968% -7.332% 1821.00 6.669612319
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -8.326% -4.707% 1821.00 6.669612319
Banco Popolare (Societe Cooperativa)
Banca Italease SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -18.318% -14.648% 1829.00 6.728505143
Risk Metrics (5%) -12.952% -10.357% 1829.00 6.728505143
Historical Simulation (1%) -20.735% -18.375% 1431.00 6.7573322
Historical Simulation (5%) -12.347% -12.105% 728.00 0.110659558
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -19.059% -15.241% 1829.00 6.728505143
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -12.971% -10.372% 1829.00 6.728505143
Piraeus Bank SA
General Bank of Greece SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -35.113% -14.298% 1830.00 6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -24.827% -10.110% 1830.00 6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -32.292% -34.919% 0.00 -4.285714286
Historical Simulation (5%) -17.713% -18.687% 0.00 -4.285714286
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -38.558% -15.701% 1830.00 6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -25.745% -10.484% 1830.00 6.735866746
Eurobank Ergasias SA
TT Hellenic Postbank SA
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Compared to the aforementioned cases, similar results are observed in the two major 
acquisitions in the banking sector of Greece as shown in Table 9 and 10. There is strong 
evidence that the 𝐻0 can be rejected in all cases except for the acquisition of General Bank of 
Greece SA by Piraeus Bank SA where using the HS method and in the 95% level of significance 
the  𝐻0 cannot be rejected. Furthermore, examining the ex-ante and post-ante average VaR 
prices, we can see that the majority of the average VaR figures after both events show a 
decline. Essentially, both the acquirers’ VaR is altered due to the acquisition deals and in both 
cases it seems to be decreased. 
 
Table 11-Credit Foncier de France SA Acquisition 
 
Table 12-Credit Agricole SA Acquisition 
Regarding the results depicted in Table 11 and 12, similar assumptions can be made for the 
French banking sector. The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases except for when the VaR was 
calculated with the HS at the 99% significant level for the acquisition of Entenial SA. Once more, 
the acquisitions have an actual effect on the acquirers’ VaR. However, after observing the ex-
ante and post-ante average VaRs, the VaR of Credit Agricole SA generally decreases after the 
deal compared to the VaR of Credit Foncier de France SA that it seems increase in general after 
the event.  
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.019% -4.273% 3.00 -6.713781937
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.428% -3.021% 3.00 -6.713781937
Historical Simulation (1%) -3.669% -3.674% 0.00 -1
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.610% -1.677% 34.00 -5.45753124
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.376% -5.029% 3.00 -6.713781937
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.332% -2.819% 3.00 -6.713781937
Credit Foncier de France SA
Entenial SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -5.183% -4.438% 1422.00 3.732332722
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.665% -3.138% 1422.00 3.732332722
Historical Simulation (1%) -7.965% -6.734% 38.00 -4.822006662
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.652% -4.504% 1125.00 3.970615686
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.649% -4.837% 1422.00 3.732332722
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.569% -3.056% 1422.00 3.732332722
Credit Lyonnais SA
Credit Agricole SA
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Table 13-UniCredit SpA Acquisition 
Concluding, as it is shown in Table 13, the results concerning the acquisitions of UniCredit SpA, 
indicate related results with the previous events examined. The null hypothesis is rejected in all 
cases for both acquisitions, except for when the VaR was calculated with the HS at the 99% 
significant level in respect to the acquisition of Rolo Banca 1473 SpA. In both events, a slight 
increase in the VaR of UniCredit SpA as observed from the post-ante average VaR figures. 
In order to examine if there was an effect of the particular phenomenon in the overall banking 
sector in the Eurozone,  the following table was constructed using the ex-ante and post-ante 
VaR figures of all the acquisitions and using their averages the same way they were used in the 
previous examinations: 
 
Table 14-Eurozone Banking Sector Acquisitions 
As it is observed in Table 14, the results found were statistically insignificant and only in the 
case of the Historical Simulation at a 95% significance level the null hypothesis is rejected due 
to fact that the z-score is marginally lower than the value of -1.645. To sum up, there is not 
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.486% -3.217% 140.00 -5.705242326
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.758% -2.275% 140.00 -5.705242326
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.024% -2.191% 0.00 -5.578573467
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.577% -1.691% 0.00 -6.274665614
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.736% -3.540% 140.00 -5.705242326
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.811% -2.343% 140.00 -5.705242326
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -3.411% -5.559% 0.00 -6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -2.412% -3.930% 0.00 -6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -6.452% -5.265% 87.00 2.165788631
Historical Simulation (5%) -3.321% -3.760% 0.00 -6.274665614
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.753% -6.116% 0.00 -6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -2.485% -4.049% 0.00 -6.735866746
UniCredit SpA
Bayerische Hypound Vereinsbank AG (HVB)
Rolo Banca 1473 SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -7.620% -5.882% 86.00 0.930757842
Risk Metrics (5%) -5.388% -4.159% 86.00 0.930757842
Historical Simulation (1%) -8.086% -8.089% 60.00 -0.413670152
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.870% -5.052% 35.00 -1.706389377
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -8.439% -6.525% 86.00 0.930757842
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -5.493% -4.214% 85.00 0.879049073
Eurozone Banking Sector Acquisitions
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strong evidence that can support the rule that in general the VaR of the banking sector of the 
Eurozone is affected by the acquisition events. 
CONCLUSION 
Utilizing knowledge from previous papers regarding the risk effects that bank M&As from 
member states of the Eurozone have on the acquirer banks, and adding to the literature, this 
research raises a crucial issue at the time. Taking into consideration the fact that financial 
oversight and capital requirements are ever increasing especially under regulatory 
governmental instruments such as the European Central Bank and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the question that was tackled with this thesis could give a beneficial 
answer to regulators and even bank managers regarding making decisions on potentially 
profitable mergers and acquisitions for their institutions.   
Taking into account some of the implications that were confronted, it must reported there was 
a lack of literature regarding the acquisition deals and their risk effects – especially on VaR 
prices – on banks in the Eurozone as well as the information regarding the deals themselves in 
both the databases and internet search engines was scarce.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIC codes Description
6000 Banks, non-US chartered
6021 National commercial banks
6029 Commercial banks, not elsewhere clasified
Acquirer and Target banks SIC codes
Acquirer Target Date Completed
Banco Santander Central Hispan SA Credito Predial Portugues SA 07/04/2000
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco totta Acores SA 07/04/2000
Banca Popolare di Milano SpA Banca di Legnano SpA 26/06/2001
UniCredit SpA Rolo Banca 1473 SpA 01/07/2002
Credit Agricole SA Credit Lyonnais SA 27/05/2003
Credit Foncier de France SA Entenial SA 04/02/2004
UniCredit SpA Bayerische Hypound Vereinsbank AG 23/11/2005
Banca Intensa SpA SanPaolo IMI SpA 01/01/2007
Banche Popolari Unite SCRL (UBI BANCA) Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA 01/04/2007
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banca CR Firenze SpA 29/01/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Galicia SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Castilla SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Credito Balear SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Vasconia SA 10/11/2008
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco De Andalucia SA 19/05/2009
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Banca Italease SpA 15/07/2009
Piraeus Bank SA General Bank of Greece SA 14/12/2012
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco Espanol de Credito SA 03/05/2013
Eurobank Ergasias SA TT Hellenic Postbank SA 02/09/2013
Banco Popular Espanol SA Banco Pastor SA 08/03/2012
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Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -9.578% -9.139% 1381.00 3.430506999
Risk Metrics (5%) -6.772% -6.462% 1381.00 3.430506999
Historical Simulation (1%) -6.866% -7.468% 0.00 -6.679958738
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.484% -5.766% 0.00 -6.679958738
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -10.770% -10.277% 1381.00 3.430506999
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -6.854% -6.541% 1381.00 3.430506999
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -8.953% -5.511% 1830.00 6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -6.330% -3.897% 1830.00 6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -8.196% -8.245% 0.00 -3.179797338
Historical Simulation (5%) -5.834% -5.768% 1288.00 16.93409823
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -10.067% -6.197% 1830.00 6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -6.407% -3.944% 1830.00 6.735866746
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -5.267% -5.460% 569.00 -2.547114639
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.724% -3.861% 569.00 -2.547114639
Historical Simulation (1%) -5.671% -6.045% 0.00 -5.841307997
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.006% -4.335% 0.00 -6.092717958
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.922% -6.140% 569.00 -2.547114639
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.769% -3.908% 569.00 -2.547114639
Banco Popular Espanol SA
Banco De Galicia SA, Banco De Castilla SA, Banco De Credito Balear SA, Banco De Vasconia SA
Banco De Andalucia SA
Banco Pastor SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -4.981% -4.333% 1646.00 5.381331794
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.522% -3.064% 1646.00 5.381331794
Historical Simulation (1%) -4.535% -4.278% 733.00 1.198649002
Historical Simulation (5%) -2.633% -2.893% 0.00 -6.451482126
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.745% -4.998% 1646.00 5.381331794
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.552% -3.090% 1646.00 5.381331794
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -4.687% -4.025% 1735.00 6.036514461
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.314% -2.846% 1735.00 6.036514461
Historical Simulation (1%) -5.355% -5.269% 191.00 0.048049998
Historical Simulation (5%) -3.833% -3.238% 1626.00 5.234099734
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.406% -4.642% 1735.00 6.036514461
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.342% -2.870% 1735.00 6.036514461
Banco Santander Central Hispan SA
Credito Predial Portugues SA, Banco totta Acores SA
Banco Espanol de Credito SA
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Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.403% -2.690% 496.00 -3.084511658
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.699% -1.902% 496.00 -3.084511658
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.373% -2.377% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.770% -1.784% 99.00 -3.676274534
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.649% -2.966% 496.00 -3.084511658
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.725% -1.931% 496.00 -3.084511658
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.782% -4.565% 14.00 -6.632804304
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.967% -3.228% 14.00 -6.632804304
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.714% -3.885% 0.00 -6.509353379
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.795% -2.086% 0.00 -6.509353379
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.067% -5.034% 14.00 -6.632804304
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.997% -3.277% 14.00 -6.632804304
Banca Intensa SpA
SanPaolo IMI SpA
Banca CR Firenze SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -3.573% -3.382% 1192.00 2.039164031
Risk Metrics (5%) -2.527% -2.391% 1192.00 2.039164031
Historical Simulation (1%) -3.811% -3.942% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -2.712% -2.655% 715.00 1.302581231
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.898% -3.690% 1192.00 2.039164031
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -2.462% -2.330% 1192.00 2.039164031
Banca Popolare di Milano SpA
Banca di Legnano SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.079% -2.305% 319.00 -4.387515389
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.470% -1.630% 319.00 -4.387515389
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.667% -2.632% 173.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.396% -1.466% 17.00 1.302581231
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.400% -2.661% 319.00 -4.387515389
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.542% -1.709% 319.00 -4.387515389
Banche Popolari Unite SCRL (UBI BANCA)
Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -11.086% -6.268% 1821.00 6.669612319
Risk Metrics (5%) -7.839% -4.432% 1821.00 6.669612319
Historical Simulation (1%) -14.049% -14.131% 0.00 -2.201398157
Historical Simulation (5%) -8.236% -8.422% 0.00 -3.407771005
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -12.968% -7.332% 1821.00 6.669612319
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -8.326% -4.707% 1821.00 6.669612319
Banco Popolare (Societe Cooperativa)
Banca Italease SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -18.318% -14.648% 1829.00 6.728505143
Risk Metrics (5%) -12.952% -10.357% 1829.00 6.728505143
Historical Simulation (1%) -20.735% -18.375% 1431.00 6.7573322
Historical Simulation (5%) -12.347% -12.105% 728.00 0.110659558
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -19.059% -15.241% 1829.00 6.728505143
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -12.971% -10.372% 1829.00 6.728505143
Piraeus Bank SA
General Bank of Greece SA
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Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -35.113% -14.298% 1830.00 6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -24.827% -10.110% 1830.00 6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -32.292% -34.919% 0.00 -4.285714286
Historical Simulation (5%) -17.713% -18.687% 0.00 -4.285714286
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -38.558% -15.701% 1830.00 6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -25.745% -10.484% 1830.00 6.735866746
Eurobank Ergasias SA
TT Hellenic Postbank SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.019% -4.273% 3.00 -6.713781937
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.428% -3.021% 3.00 -6.713781937
Historical Simulation (1%) -3.669% -3.674% 0.00 -1
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.610% -1.677% 34.00 -5.45753124
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.376% -5.029% 3.00 -6.713781937
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.332% -2.819% 3.00 -6.713781937
Credit Foncier de France SA
Entenial SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -5.183% -4.438% 1422.00 3.732332722
Risk Metrics (5%) -3.665% -3.138% 1422.00 3.732332722
Historical Simulation (1%) -7.965% -6.734% 38.00 -4.822006662
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.652% -4.504% 1125.00 3.970615686
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -5.649% -4.837% 1422.00 3.732332722
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -3.569% -3.056% 1422.00 3.732332722
Credit Lyonnais SA
Credit Agricole SA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -2.486% -3.217% 140.00 -5.705242326
Risk Metrics (5%) -1.758% -2.275% 140.00 -5.705242326
Historical Simulation (1%) -2.024% -2.191% 0.00 -5.578573467
Historical Simulation (5%) -1.577% -1.691% 0.00 -6.274665614
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -2.736% -3.540% 140.00 -5.705242326
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -1.811% -2.343% 140.00 -5.705242326
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -3.411% -5.559% 0.00 -6.735866746
Risk Metrics (5%) -2.412% -3.930% 0.00 -6.735866746
Historical Simulation (1%) -6.452% -5.265% 87.00 2.165788631
Historical Simulation (5%) -3.321% -3.760% 0.00 -6.274665614
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -3.753% -6.116% 0.00 -6.735866746
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -2.485% -4.049% 0.00 -6.735866746
UniCredit SpA
Bayerische Hypound Vereinsbank AG (HVB)
Rolo Banca 1473 SpA
Ex-Ante Average VaR Post-Ante Average VaR W Z
Risk Metrics (1%) -7.620% -5.882% 86.00 0.930757842
Risk Metrics (5%) -5.388% -4.159% 86.00 0.930757842
Historical Simulation (1%) -8.086% -8.089% 60.00 -0.413670152
Historical Simulation (5%) -4.870% -5.052% 35.00 -1.706389377
Filtered Historical Simulation (1%) -8.439% -6.525% 86.00 0.930757842
Filtered Historical Simulation (5%) -5.493% -4.214% 85.00 0.879049073
Eurozone Banking Sector Acquisitions
